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CORPORATION S-STOCK RESTRICTION-AGREEM ENT AMONG MEMBERS OF CLOSE FAMILY CORPORATION To RESTRICT SALE OF STOCK

Is

NOT VOID MERELY BECAUSE OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN

OPTION

PRICE AND ACTUAL VALUE OF STOCK.

Mather Estate (Pa. 1963)
Petitioner filed suit in Orphan's Court to compel specific performance
by the executors of a stock option agreement entered into with decedent.
The agreement was among three of the stockholders' of a close family
corporation, which was originally a partnership. By the terms of the
agreement the stock was to be offered to the remaining members for one
dollar per share on the death of the signer or in the event one of the
members wished to sell his stock during his life. The book value of the
stock at the time of the agreement was zero while the actual value was
not less than fifty dollars. At the time the agreement was sought to be
ehforced, book value was 444.92 dollars and actual value was not less than
1,060 dollars per share. The Orphan's Court ordered specific performance
of the written stock option agreement. On appeal, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, Justice Cohen dissenting, affirmed and held that where
the agreement was made between mature membeis of a family without
overreaching or fraud, the agreement was enforceable, and not unreasonable
merely because of the discrepancy between option price and actual value at
time of sale. Mather Estate, 410 Pa. 361, 189 A.2d 586 (1963).
Stock transfer restrictions are limitations binding on the stockholder
which prevent him from freely transferring his stock interest in the corporation. They may be imposed by the articles of incorporation, the bylaws or private agreements among the stockholders, or by a combination
of these means. The type of restriction generally used is the "first option"
or "first refusal" provision by which the stockholder or his executors must
first offer the stock to a specified party, in the event of a desire to sell or
death, at a price determined by the provision. The optionees have a
certain period of time in which to purchase or refuse to purchase. If they
refuse or the time lapses, the stock becomes freely transferable. Restrictions
may also take the form of consent restraints requiring approval of transfer
by certain individuals, restraints limiting transfers to specified classes of2
persons, buy and sell arrangements or express, absolute restrictions.
1. Charles Mather, his two sons, Victor and Gilbert, and his daughter Josephine
were the original members. Charles died in 1928. Gilbert and Victor pursuant to
agreement purchased his shares at $50 per share. Charles a grandson entered the
picture in 1933. The three men entered into the agreement in question in 1939. Upon
Victor's death in 1943, his stock was purchased by Gilbert and Charles. Josephine
died in 1953 and her stock was sold to the Company. In 1959, Gilbert passed away,
and the sole survivor Charles occasioned the suit by asking to purchase his stock
according to the agreement.
2. O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:
Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. REv. 773, 778 (1952).
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Generally, the rule is that a stock transfer restriction is valid if
"reasonable." '3 Thus, absolute restrictions of any kind are held unenforceable,4 as are those which are in effect absolute, including consent restrains5
6
and restraints forbidding transfer to competitors or other classes of persons.
1
While the first option type of restriction was early held invalid, more
recently it has been considered enforceable although it must be reasonable. 8
First refusal provisions may be justified by the fact that after the option
period, the stock is free of all restraint.
One commentator has suggested that the underlying test of whether
a restriction is reasonable or not is to be decided by determining whether
the restraint is so needed by the particular enterprise as to override the
policy of free alienation of stock.9 The specific factors which the courts
have considered in determining reasonableness are more varied, however.",
The price-value differential, the purpose of the restriction, the size of the
corporation and the degree of restraint seem to be the major factors.
In Palmer v. Chamberlin," where the option price was fixed at book
value, the executrix argued that this price was too low in light of the
earning record of the company. The court upheld the restriction as
reasonable suggesting as a test for unreasonableness that "the difference
between [the stipulated price formula] and fair market value must be so
'2
great as to suggest fraud, mistake or concealment in the nature of fraud.' 1
The implication is that no provision made in good faith can be voided
merely because of price considerations. Another example of the length
to which the courts may go in condoning a price inadequacy is Allen v.
Biltmore Tissue Corp.1 3 In that case, a by-law provided for an option
price to be the same as the original purchase price. The court said that
between option price and current
to be invalid, more than mere disparity
14
value of the stock must be shown.
3. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 779 (rev. ed. 1946);
CORPORATIONS § 5453 (rev. vol. 1957) ; O'Neal, supra note

12 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
2, at 777. For numerous

cases see, 61 A.L.R.2d 1318 (1958) ; 65 A.L.R.2d 1159 (1930).

4. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
5. Miller v. Farmers' Milling & Elevator Co., 78 Neb. 441, 110 N.W. 995 (1907);
Fisher v. Bush, 35 Hun. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885); ROHRLICH, ORGANIZING COR-

114 (3d ed. 1958).
6. See, e.g., Kretzer v. Cole Bros. Lightning Rod Co., 193 Mo. App. 99, 181 S.W.
1066 (1916) ; BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 778 (rev. ed. 1946).
7. Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 34 Atl. 1127 (1896) ; Moore v.
Bank of Commerce, 52 Mo. 377 (1873).
8. Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 145 Atd. 391 (1929);
Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 AtI. 118 (Ch. 1924) ; Allen v. Biltmore
Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812 (1957).
9. O'Neal, supra note 2, at 779.
10. See, HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE 243 (1959); Barron,
Arrangements - Validity and Enforcement of Restrictions on Share Transfer and
Buy-Out. Various Types of Restrictions in Ohio, 31 U. CINC. L. REv. 266, 267 (1962);
O'Neal, supra note 2, at 779.
PORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

11. 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951).
12. Id. at 541.

13. 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d 812 (1957).
14. 141 N.E.2d 812, 817 (1957).
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The purposes of the specific restriction either as set out in the
provision or as found by the court often play the most important role in
the decision as to reasonableness of the restriction. A close corporation
has been defined as one wherein all the outstanding stock is owned by those
members of the firm (or members of their immediate family) who take
most active part in the control and management of the corporation. 15 The
elements of every corporation are theoretically centralized management in
a board, continuity of life, even after death of an important member and
free alienability of stock. 1 The incorporators of a close corporation seek
to preserve the more desirable partnership features of highly personal
intra-business relations and the right to choose associates, both of which
conflict with one element of corporateness-free alienability of stock. The
shareholders in a close corporation are in constant and intimate contact
with one another. Their decisions are made informally and frequently
without any regard to their actual holdings. Thus, stockholders in such
ventures often have a real desire and a good reason to restrict the membership in the corporation. In addition, the members may wish to protect
themselves against incompetent shareholders or those whose personalities
may clash with the present members.
In Lawson v. Household Finance Corp.,' 7 the court in upholding a first option agreement considered whether the restriction was
"necessary or convenient" to the attainment of the object set forth
in the
charter. The corporation in question was engaged in making small loans
not exceeding $300, without security, upon the reputation of the borrower.
The court said that this restriction was "necessary or convenient," noting
that the business was a "precarious" one, apparently meaning that the
members of the corporation had to be competent and trustworthy. But a
restraint for ten years on alienation of voting trust provisions was held
unreasonable in Tracey v. Franklin.'8 The court there reasoned that where
there was no particular purpose to benefit the corporation or other stockholders or to do anything other than solidify ownership in the agreeing
parties, the purpose was legally insufficient to support the restraint.
A restriction requiring the consent of the directors was sustained in
Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Ave., Inc.'8 Since the corporation involved was a cooperative apartment house, the decision can be
justified by the peculiar nature of the corporation. If, as suspected, the
courts go on a case to case basis, there is little to guide an attorney in
preparing a restriction.2 °
15. ROHRLICH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 109.
16. Hornstein, Judicial Tolerance of the Incorporated Partnership, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 435, 441 (1953).
17. 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
18. 31 Del. Ch. 477, 67 A.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
19. 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1939).
20. Painter, Stock Transfer Restrictions: Continuing Uncertainties and a Legislative Proposal, 6 VILL. L. RZv. 48, 58 (1960). The author makes a probing analysis
of several cases, enumerating all the uncertainties to which the counsellor is subjected
and proposing action by legislation which might solve the problem.
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The rationale for the rule against restrictions is that stock is personal
property, and traditionally restraints on the alienation of personal property
have not been favored. 2 1 It has been suggested that restraints are held
to contravene public policy because they may be socially and economically
unsound. 22 Outside of this very general statement, the courts do not
provide any further enlightenment. The premises are assumed and the cases
are decided accordingly.23 Logically, the property concept of stock should
prevent any restriction, but reasonable restrictions have been enforced.
The stockholders, in spite of statutory provisions, may also be considered as "creators of the company's constitution and therefore . . . the

stock certificates -are essentially contractual choses in action. '24 Justice
Holmes in upholding a by-law restriction requiring a first option observed
that the purchase of stock creates a personal relation analogous to a
partnership, and that "[n] otwithstanding decisions under statutes ... there
seems to be no greater objection to retaining the right of choosing one's
associates in a corporation than in a firm."25 Thus, some courts have
emphasized the contractual aspect of the provision restricting the transfer
and have directed that an arbitrator be appointed to value stock for purposes
of sale to optionees, 26 or have prevented a sale of stock unless the vendor
conformed to the restrictions.2 7 Other cases have reasoned that although
by-laws imposing restrictions may be invalid, the restrictions may be
enforced against those assenting to the by-laws as if imposed by a separate
agreement. 28 A projection of this reasoning would allow those not assenting
to the by-law to act as they pleased in regard to the restriction.
Several controlling considerations may have been neglected in the
instant case. The majority merely assumed that the purpose of the restriction was valid, without analyzing the appropriate factors in determining
its validity. Although the agreement was doubtless the intent of the parties,
it may well have been subjected to closer scrutiny, if the "special circumstances" requirement of the Lawson case or the reasoning of the Tracey
case had been applied. It should be noted, however, that the purpose of
the contract in the instant case is related to that of choosing one's associates,
which restrictive provisions usually contain as justification for their imposition, and which has been upheld as a valid purpose. Thus, although the
court's decision would probably have been unchanged had it analyzed the
purpose issue fully, its seeming reluctance to treat the issue indicates a
21. FLeTCHER, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 5452; Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporation, 37 VA. L. Rev. 229, 232 (1951). Some courts
will have little difficulty in deciding whether stock is personal property or not. See,
e.g., PA. STAT. tit. 15 § 134 (1958): "The stock of every corporation created under
the provisions of this statute shall be deemed personal property.
22. Cataldo, supra note 21.
23. Painter, supra note 20, at 49 treats the early handling of the problem rather
extensively.
24. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American Corporation Law, 69
HARV. L. Rgv. 1369, 1377 (1956).
25. Barrett v. King, 181 Mass. 476, 479, 63 N.E. 934, 935 (1902).
26. Fitzsimmons v. Lindsay, 205 Pa. 79, 54 AtI. 488 (1903).
27. Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1930).
28. Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34, 145 AtI. 391 (1929).
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desire to uphold such agreements notwithstanding what proper analysis
might uncover.
Secondly, even ignoring the vast disparity between option price and
purported actual value at time of sale, as the Allen case suggests should be
done, the court should have considered the disparity between option price
and purported actual value at time of contract. Although the Allen and
Palmer cases formulated criteria which would allow any price to be
reasonable, they are easily distinguishable. The restriction here is extremely
close to an absolute restraint, resembling one requiring the consent of
members of the corporation before transfer to outsiders. The total contract
price is a mere 501 dollars as contrasted with purported actual value at the
time of suit in excess of 500,000 dollars and at time of contract of over
25,000 dollars. Thus, it hardly seems realistic to contend that the optionees
might fail to exercise the option or that the parties could have altered the
price before the time of sale.
Although the decision cannot be justified by its rationale, perhaps it
can be justified by its policy implications. The attitude of the legislature
in failing to distinguish between close corporations and publicly held ones
has largely frustrated those partnerships that seek corporate form, but
wish to retain a good deal of the substance of the partnership. So, the
members impose restrictions on transfers in an attempt to have the
advantages of both forms of operation.
At best, the rationale behind the rule of reasonable restrictions is weak.
Granting that stock is personal property, as some statutes command, and
ignoring its contract implications, it is still not at all clear why the same
rules should apply to stock as to tangible items. Ownership of a corporation is obviously something very different from ownership of a desk or
a tool or even land. The courts have recognized the clear divergence by
allowing reasonable restrictions, but thus far no court seems to have been
so bold as to justify its decision by ruling that incorporated partnerships
are perfectly valid in the absence of a specific statute. Holding a restriction
invalid makes even less sense when, as in this case, the parties have
expressly agreed to it, without coercion from the by-laws and without
evidence being produced to show that the contract was intended to defraud
creditors or any interested party.
In addition, since the parties in a close corporation can choose one
another before incorporating, why should they not also be able to agree
to prevent the entry into the firm of an undesirable after incorporating?
They could have easily accomplished the same purpose through a partnership, though without the advantages of a corporate form. As for the low
price, the parties entered into the agreement unaware of future stock
prices and future growth of the business. They may well have been
reluctant to set a price which the survivors might be unable to afford, or
may have been apprehensive of what one party might do to effect a sale
since there is no standard market for the stock of a close corporation. A
corporation such as this is a partnership in corporation clothes, and if as
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